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CENTRAL ARMY CLUB TROOP INDOCTRINATION ACTIVITIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jul 77 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen M. Mikhaylov, chief, Central House of the Soviet Army imeni M. V. Frunze: "The Radius of Influence"]

[Excerpts] The fighting men of many units of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany will long remember the visit by USSR pilot-cosmonaut P. Popovich, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of Socialist Labor K. Utenkov, a worker at the Moscow Motor Vehicle Plant imeni I. A. Likhachev, Hero of the Soviet Union V. Karpov, the writer, and Professor F. Burlatskiy, doctor of philosophical sciences. The guests gave different pictures of our vital, energetic native country which is engaged in fulfilling the historic decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and going forward to the glorious 60th anniversary of Great October. They gave convincing answers to the questions which interested the soldiers.

Each year many such meetings and discussions are conducted in the armies and fleets through the offices of the Central House of the Soviet Army (CHSA). Dozens of agitation-propaganda brigades and groups are sent to fighting men serving outside the boundaries of our country, on its borders, and in remote garrisons. And for the personnel of the units, ships, and outposts each such meeting is a brilliant, memorable event and promotes a thorough understanding of the missions they face. Propaganda work has become especially widespread in this anniversary year. Suffice it to say that up to 13,000 lectures on problems of Marxist-Leninist theory, the principles of Soviet military building, and issues of science and technology, pedagogy, and psychology will be given this year for officers alone by non-staff lecturers of the CHSA.

We try to attract the country's leading propagandists to give lectures. Academicians N. Nekrasov and V. Glushkov and corresponding members of the Academy of Sciences USSR G. Sorokin and P. Zhilin are now giving very successful presentations at the CHSA and on trips sponsored by it. And this represents one of our long-standing traditions: prominent scientists have always spoken at the CHSA.

As always, veterans of the revolution, old Bolsheviks, and veterans of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars are given a broad podium.

We devote special attention to work with army and navy propagandists. Upon requests from the political directorates of the branches of the Armed Forces, the military districts, fleets, and groups of forces large numbers of qualified lecturers are sent to assist them. They provide the propagandists with rich scientific information and promote better propaganda work in the local areas.

Congress and October readings have established themselves in CHSA practices as an active means of ideological indoctrination of the fighting men. Each reading, of course, demands not only profound and careful development of the topic, but also skillful use of documentary and artistic films and other means of achieving emotional impact. The readings on the topics "The Marxist-Leninist Theory of Social Revolution and the Present Day," "The 25th CPSU Congress on the Essence and Primary Features of a Developed Socialist Society," and "Concern for the Welfare of the People Is the Highest Goal of CPSU Policy" were prepared and conducted in precisely this way.

The work of the CHSA is vast and multileveled. Assistance to commanders and political agencies in bolstering the activities of cultural educational institutions occupies an important place in it. This means carefully studying everything new and progressive that exists in cultural educational work in the local areas and introducing useful know-how into practice. It also means participation in the training assemblies of club and library workers, publishing methodological literature, and rendering methodological assistance to the leaders of amateur artistic activities and organizers of competitive chess and checkers. The CHSA sends brigades of experienced methodologists to the units to do this.

The composition of our Armed Forces is multinational. It is natural that we take this into account when forming creative collectives and artistic-agitation brigades to travel to the troops. Many garrisons have already been visited by emissaries of the CHSA: the Sovremennik (Moldavian) and Eolika (Georgian) vocal-instrumental ensembles, the Vana Toomas Stage Ensemble from Tallin, and other collectives. They usually work very hard, generously bestowing their original art on audiences. For example, the Tbilisi Doluri Ensemble appeared before fighting men more than 100 times in a year.

When forming brigades to send to the troops we devote paramount attention to the content of propaganda measures and the concert programs. We try to see that the CHSA emissaries use their artistic means to deeply and thoroughly reveal the world historical importance of the October revolution and the leadership role of the party in creating and strengthening history's first socialist state and indoctrinate army and navy personnel in the glorious revolutionary, labor, and fighting traditions of the CPSU, the working class, and all the Soviet people.

Showing the international mission of the Soviet Armed Forces and the labor and political activity of Soviet people in the struggle to carry out the majestic plans of communist building and the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress occupies an important place in the repertoire.

The CHSA's ties with political agencies are growing broader and stronger.

The great spiritual needs of our fighting men can only be gratifying. But they do force us to think seriously about what must be done so that our work will have the maximum impact in raising the efficiency and quality of combat training and be entirely appropriate to the cultural level of the fighting men. We are called to profound, comprehensive reflections on improving all our activity by the penetrating words of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, written on 12 May 1976 in the Book of Honored Guests of the CHSA: "The CHSA collective is active in helping commanders and political agencies in communist indoctrination of the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces. I wish you new successes in fulfilling the decisions of the 25th congress of our party."

Responding to L. I. Brezhnev's good wishes by our deeds and objectively and critically evaluating our own activity, we continue to strengthen our ties with cultural establishments and the creative unions, commanders, and political agencies. We are trying to make all CHSA employees feel more responsible for the results of their labor, and we are doing everything possible to expand the radius and increase the degree of our influence on the state and level of cultural educational work among the groups.

11,176 CSO: 8108

SHORTCOMINGS NOTED IN SIGNAL AND RADAR SUPPORT BATTALION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jul 77 p 4

[Article by Lt Col V. Bogdanovskiy: "The Fruits of Lack of Principle - Following Up Letters"]

[Text] In their letter to the editors warrant officers (praporshchiks) A. Leont'ev, N. Mullabayev, and others reported that the detached communications and radar support battalion commanded by Lt Col. A. Morozov is not taking proper care of motor vehicle transport equipment. Furthermore, WO N. Perepadya, acting chief of the motor vehicle service of the unit, not only dodged his assigned work; he even sold off spare parts. The letter said, "He carried off an engine, a frame, a body, and tubes and tires for a Gaz-69 car to his own personal garage." Other cases of abuses were also cited.

Did they know about this in the battalion? Yes, they did. But a preliminary investigation was conducted only after a telephone call from higher headquarters. The car assembled by Warrant Officer Perepadya in his private garage was taken away. He himself was called to account before the party.

It would appear that justice won out. And this would be an end of it. But it is too soon to say that. I talked with the commander, his deputies, and the secretary of the party bureau and I was left with a feeling that they were far from a principled evaluation of what had occurred. I was especially struck by the odd comment by Maj N. Alekseyev, deputy commander for technical affairs: "These bickerers won't let us work!" It appears that this comment should be taken to mean that the ones to blame for what happened are not WO N. Perepadya or Maj N. Alekseyev, who trusted his subordinate completely and did not check on his actions, but rather those who wrote the letter. A similar conclusion could be reached after reading the confidential service report on the warrant officer signed by the deputy commander for technical affairs: "Warrant Officer Perepadya has studied motor vehicle equipment very well and uses it intelligently. He searches for spare parts on a daily basis. He keeps technical documents intelligently." And so forth and so on.

But what about the facts? Can it be true that Maj. N. Alekseyev is unaware that WO N. Perepadya is sometimes rude and disrespectful with his subordinates, does not by any means do everything necessary to maintain the motor vehicles in constant operating readiness, and sells off spare parts.

"What use to the unit are parts and assemblies from discarded vehicles?" N. Alekseyev asked in surprise. Not to speak of others, he himself certainly ought to have known that a special document is made up when discarded vehicles are dismantled. Furthermore, this document indicates the category of the parts, instruments, assemblies, and aggregates and whether they can be used further. Parts which are usable or need repair are entered as incoming assets in the unit's primary records.

In short, there is an established procedure and it cannot be violated. But we see here an officer to whom an important sector was entrusted and yet he feels that nothing serious has happened. Did the warrant officer take a motor from the warehouse for his car? The major did not see it. Did he and Pvt S. Khodov take tires to a neighboring organization? The major says it may be true; he does not know. Did the warrant officer remove the doors from a car and take them home? But, the major says, he replaced them with others...

Everything is simple and easy. And it appears that this complacent attitude found in certain officials has been passed on to many others. How else can we explain the fact that not one person spoke out at the party meeting which discussed the personal file of communist N. Perepadya. Later Lt I. Sabirov, secretary of the party bureau, said that the party organization drew the correct conclusion from this case. But what conclusions could he be talking about if there was no principled evaluation at the meeting of the warrant officer's unseemly actions?

And how was the party investigation conducted? Those who made the investigation did not consider it necessary to talk with all the people who knew of the abuses permitted by N. Perepadya. Many facts remained completely outside the purview of the party bureau. And therefore, even those who until recently had been deeply disturbed by the warrant officer's actions suddenly fell silent; they "folded." "What reason was there to speak?" WO A. Leont'yev asked. "The way the leadership has decided is how it will be. In other words, the people there understood that no one wanted to hear their opinion. We were simply observing a formality."

A person who is confident that his voice is listened to and that his suggestions will be considered and an effort made to implement them typically feels a true sense of responsibility. But here? Warrant Officer Leont'yev and the other comrades informed the commander and secretary of the party bureau of the improper actions of their fellow serviceman and expected that the necessary steps would be taken to see that such a thing did not happen again. But they were waved aside.

Many interesting proposals deserving of attention were made at the report and election party meeting, but they too were left hanging in the air!

After this there is no reason to be surprised that the activism of communists in the battalion has decreased. The influence of the party organization on all aspects of the life and combat training of the subunit has also decreased. Some communists try to stay out of the way when what is necessary is a thorough analysis of existing shortcomings and determination of concrete steps to eliminate them. We have in mind here not just the passivism seen at the meeting discussed above. Certain communists also showed a lack of principle when the personal file of communist N. Alekseyev was brought up for discussion by a party meeting and when certain other questions had to be decided.

The men know, of course, that WO N. Perepadya compromised himself. But he has been left in his former position. And what has changed is the attitude shown to the authors of the letter to the editor. Is this why WO N. Mullabayev plans to transfer to another unit and WO A. Leont'yev is being discharged into the reserve?

For the sake of objectivity we will note that warrant officers Leont'yev and Mullabayev are not without fault; they too make mistakes sometimes. But in this case these comrades acted on principle, in the interests of the service. And after this why not think about what causes certain servicemen of the subunit to violate regulation requirements? What prevents personnel from fulfilling the obligations they assumed in competition?

But they are not thinking about it. I believe the time for thought has come. For some years now the battalion has not been particularly outstanding in training or discipline. And the reason appears to be their tolerant attitude toward shortcomings, the fact that an atmosphere of mutual high standards and principles has not been established in the collective.

From the Editors. This report was already prepared for printing when the editors received another letter from warrant officers A. Leont'yev and N. Mullabayev. They report that Comrade Lisitsyn, an officer from higher headquarters, also visited the battalion to check on the facts they had presented, but the situation has not changed for the better. As for Warrant Officer Perepadya, they "found" another position for him: head of the equipment storehouse!

The editors hope that a principled party evaluation will be given to the shortcomings noted in the report published above.

11,176 CSO: 1801

FIGHTER AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jul 77 p 1

[Article by WO V. Mutovkin, specialist 1st class, Red Banner Far East Military District: "Guaranteed Quality"]

[Text] As soon as the fighter plane was rolled into the hangar of the maintenance unit work on it began in a rush. The heads of the scheduled maintenance work groups carefully inspected the aviation machinery and determined what needed to be done and which specialist should do it. Capt Tech Ser B. Boroda determined exactly what was necessary to prepare the aviation equipment. The fuel gauge was giving inaccurate readings. WO V. Lykuov was to check it first of all. There were no remarks concerning the electrical equipment, which meant that I would follow the regular plan.

Using the loud speaker I informed the controller, Jr Sgt V. Rudnev, that I was beginning to remove the electrical units. On the light panel he immediately switched on the time counter and a diagram of the critical path schedule in which the operation being performed showed up as a circle with a standard designation. On the adjacent panel was a warning sign: "Do not energize the aircraft." I looked at it while removing the mechanisms; the specialists of other groups needed electrical current. I had to perform my operations without delay to avoid letting them down.

I removed the units quickly. Then they were tested in the laboratory. The parameters of the signal box and automatic controls for control surfaces met technical specifications. But one light needed adjustment because its tilt angle was somewhat at variance with the assigned angle. I tried to make the direction of the beam accurate to hundredths of a degree. I recalled the words of Lt Col V. Maslin, military pilotsniper, that during the landing run without ground searchlights, using only the aircraft lights, even a slight misalignment of the beam has a negative effect on the accuracy of the calculation.

Awareness of responsibility for the assigned work sector is essential in any job, but this is particularly true in preparing aircraft. Of course, the work of specialists is strictly monitored, operation by operation. But an equally reliable guarantee of high-quality work is a sense of personal responsibility. The carelessness of a single specialist can nullify the efforts of numerous airmen. Here is an incident. PFC V. Lesner installed an instrument incorrectly. His error was discovered when the engine was being revved prior to turning the aircraft over to a squadron. Several assemblies had to be removed again to eliminate the trouble and valuable time was lost.

In his talk at the 16th Congress of USSR Trade Unions Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said that every person must work well enough not to be ashamed before our country, well enough to look comrades in the eye with an easy conscience. It is precisely such a responsible attitude toward work that distinguishes the leaders in competition, our best specialists. The military collective in which I serve has held the title of outstanding for six years in a row now. For three years the challenge prize for victory in the competition for best maintenance unit has hung in a prominent place in our hangar.

Personnel are participating with great enthusiasm in the competition to celebrate the 60th anniversary of October in a worthy manner. The decisions of the May 1977 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the draft of the new USSR Constitution have called forth a surge of activity among all aviators. Our slogan is to perform scheduled maintenance work with guaranteed quality. This point is included in the personal obligations of all aviation specialists. The airmen of the squadrons are monitoring fulfillment of the obligations we have assumed. When an aircraft is received from the maintenance unit, they also receive a guarantee coupon which they have the right to return if they find mistakes made by us. But this has not happened once. In the last three years not a single coupon has been returned to us.

After installing the light in the plane I reported to the controller. He asked the chief of the group to check my work. The use of the controller system has noticeably increased the spirit of competition in work by mechanics. For example, if some specialist gets in trouble with an operation the light panel informs us that the delay is the fault of the particular group. Then the one who is holding us up is known to the whole collective and can feel sharply the reaction of the others. Captain Boroda, the chief of the group, checked the adjustment and installation of the light and there were no criticisms. I had done my job. But now how about WO V. Lyukov, did he need help? He and I have been in the same collective for more than 15 years. We are friends and used to helping one another perform the most laborintensive operations. In great concentration, Lyukov was testing the fuel gauge equipment. It had proved difficult to find the cause of the inaccurate readings and a careful analysis of the interaction of the elements of the system was required. Nevertheless, Lyukov soon found the trouble; a capacitor was defective, and he began replacing

All our warrant officers are now specialists 1st class. Almost half of the regular-term fighting men have first-class qualifications. PFC A. Genne, for example, knows the fuel system perfectly and has mastered a related specialization. PFC R. Gabbasov can check the radar sight for all parameters. Less than a year has passed since Sgt Yu. Sladkov, Jr Sgt N. Tur, and Pvt I. Gofart arrived in the maintenance unit and they are already specialists 2nd class. All fighting men measure themselves against the best. Many of the aviation specialists attend the technical study circle led by Sr Lt V. Kalmychkov and experienced specialists have assumed sponsorship of many newer men. We, the highly rated mechanics, gladly share our knowledge and abilities with them.

The scheduled maintenance work went ahead strictly according to schedule. And at the appointed time specialists arrived from the squadron. They were very fussy in receiving the fighter plane, but once again our work was recognized as outstanding. As always, we gave them a guarantee coupon, the mark of quality of our military labor.

11,176 CSO: 1801 TANK BATTALION COMMANDER ON IMPROVING TECHNICAL TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jul 77 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Kostyuk, commander of a tank battalion, Red Banner Odessa Military District: "Special Reserve"]

[Text] Pvt A. Sorochan was performing a tank driving exercise. The vehicle successfully crossed a minefield. Then suddenly, when approaching a ford, the mechanic-driver stopped the tank.

"The engine is overheated. I don't know why," he reported in agitation to the training leader.

The trouble was very minor. Why did the young mechanic-driver fail to find it?

It turned out that technical training periods in his company were not helpful. Warrant Officer (praporshchik) Yeroshenko, senior technician of the company, failed to take a differentiated approach to teaching the mechanic-drivers. He oriented himself to a specialist with average training. Those who were above this level found the training periods a little boring, while those who, like Private Sorochan, had not thoroughly mastered the practical questions, found the higher material beyond them.

A second and equally important reason lay in the mechanic-driver himself. His superficial knowledge of the equipment did not bother this soldier.

Thus, the incident at the tank training grounds provided a peek at serious flaws in our indoctrination work. We had failed to see that every fighting man was striving for true mastery, that the men sought out and struggled for the essential knowledge and skills without waiting for someone to give them these things.

A discussion of how to make better use of the mobilizing force of socialist competition to indoctrinate the fighting men with a spirit of

real technical sophistication was held at a meeting of battalion communists; the subject concerned many of us.

In the first stage of the competition to celebrate the 60th anniversary of Great October in a worthy manner 62 percent of the crew commanders, gunners, and mechanic-drivers prepared themselves to earn first and second class ratings. But only two-thirds of those who took the tests fulfilled their obligations.

A thorough analysis of the situation showed once again that the number of highly rated specialists is directly dependent on the ability of officers and warrant officers to systematically and consistently build up the knowledge and skills of their subordinates. Sr Lt V. Gulin has the reputation in the battalion of being an exacting commander and skillful teacher and methodologist. And the company entrusted to him did better than the others with respect to improving ratings. The quality of combat training rose noticeably in the subunit.

The battalion staff summarized and disseminated the know-how of the commander of the best company. We began searching for reserves which were not being used in full. Personnel have good opportunities to replenish and test their knowledge and acquire skills when servicing the equipment, especially on servicing days. But, of course, everything depends on how well organized the scheduled maintenance work is.

At the start of one of the servicing days I asked what assignments Sr Lt A. Balayev, company commander, had given his crews. It turned out that he had formulated the mission for his subordinates as follows: check the condition of the vehicles and eliminate any problems you find. Obviously, real competition is impossible on such an indefinite basis.

For example, one of the crews reported that they had already eliminated the one defect found in the vehicle. But a check revealed several other problems. If it had not been for this check, they would have remained after the servicing day. How can one talk of using the educational force of competition when servicing work is organized in such a way?

Once again we had to give a detailed explanation of how to prepare for and conduct servicing days. Demonstration training periods were held. Lieutenants S. Budnikov and A. Korobka, platoon leaders, and WO I. Gritsenko, senior technician of the company, shared valuable pieces of experience with their fellow servicemen. Servicing days became more productive. They were now permeated with a spirit of competition.

During the summer training period a good deal of work was also done to eliminate gaps in military-technical propaganda. Topical evening discussions of combat equipment and weapons, competition for best knowledge of the physical equipment of the tank, and technical quizzes and contests became more interesting in the battalion. Film lecture evenings and question and answer evenings were added to the arsenal of propaganda activities.

The technical study circles are making a major contribution to training more highly rated specialists. Each specialist category studies separately in our battalion, according to its own program.

Service in a tank subunit naturally gives every individual some technical knowledge. But how much knowledge depends on us, the commanders. It is our party duty to organize training and competition so that each fighting man may become a person of true technical sophistication. And successes here will be greater when the commander has a clearer idea of the moral-political and psychological aspects of mastering equipment and weapons. It is my opinion that now, during discussion of the draft of the new USSR Constitution, these aspects are our special reserve for achieving a further increase in the role of socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of Great October.

11,176 CSO: 1801

NEED FOR COMMANDER INITIATIVE IN COMBAT STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jul 77 p 1

[Editorial: "The Commander's Initiative in Battle"]

[Text] It was during the Great Patriotic War, in the fighting to liberate Belorussia. Trying to stop the advance of Soviet forces in the Pinskiye marshes region the Nazis established a fortified strongpoint in one of the villages to which a single road ran. The battalion commanded by Capt S. Artemenko was given the mission of clearing the path for movement to the west. After evaluating the situation the commander decided to attack not along the road, but rather across the marshes in order to strike the enemy in the rear where the Nazis would never expect an attack. Artemenko ordered one platoon to draw the attention of the fascists and sent three companies across the bogs to envelop the enemy. By morning the large enemy garrison was utterly defeated. The battalion commander, now Col (Ret) S. Ye. Artemenko, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, pitted his tactical skill against the enemy's advantages; he operated with initiative, daring, and determination. During the war years the initiative of commanders, military resourcefulness and cleverness, helped us defeat the enemy in the most difficult situations.

Now that the army and navy have new means of struggle the importance of initiative has increased greatly. Modern battle is characterized by the decisiveness, dynamism, and rapid and abrupt changes of combat situations. Under such conditions it becomes especially important for the commanders and personnel of subunits, units, and ships to act with initiative. The search now underway in the armed forces for methods and procedures of using the new combat equipment and weapons most effectively offers a broad field for showing commander's initiative.

Command qualities, including the ability to wage battle with initiative are most fully acquired and revealed today at tactical and special tactical exercises where the situation itself, which is maximally approximated to that of combat, inspires officers to be creative.

The flight led by Capt Yu. Ovchinnikov, military pilot 1st class, was assigned to find a crossing and strike it. But the clouds were becoming thicker and thicker. Ovchinnikov lowered their flying altitude. This made it difficult to carry on visual orientation, but allowed them to reach the assigned region unexpectedly. The strike against the crossing was bold, timely, and accurate. The training leader gave a high mark to the tactical training of the aerial fighters. The commander of the group had made resourceful use of a situation which seemed disadvantageous: weather conditions, lack of precise data on the place of the target, and he had been able to achieve surprise and carry out the mission.

Initiative is an important quality in a commander. In battle this quality reveals itself in the ability to find the most advantageous methods of performing the given mission, to use the weapons and equipment to their fullest extent, to adopt a correct plan independently, to boldly assume full responsibility for consequences, and at the proper moment to employ procedures which catch the enemy by surprise and lead to his defeat.

This ability does not come of itself. It is based on political maturity, outstanding knowledge of military affairs, and a deep understanding of one's duty and personal responsibility for the defense of our Soviet land. Intelligent initiative is seen primarily in commanders who have a good knowledge of the requirements of the military regulations and the combat capabilities of their own men and means, are well aware of the enemy's strong and weak points, and are able to understand a combat situation quickly and intelligently. This demands great military erudition, self-reliance, and determination of the commander. These qualities are formed in daily combat training, practical fulfillment of combat training missions. And the more educational the situation at training periods and exercises is the faster a commander will develop. That is why it is very important for field training, flight, and ship cruises to be conducted under conditions which maximally approximate those of combat. Commanders and staff officers should see that every training period is conducted on the proper methodological level, contains some new elements, and is packed with unexpected inputs and unusual situations. Only then will the officer develop resourceful thinking and the ability to evaluate a situation quickly and correctly and adopt an optimal plan.

However, instilling initiative is not given proper significance everywhere. At an exercise when the tactical situation changed unexpectedly Capt V. Pestroukhov, commander of a tank battalion, restricted the initiative of his company commanders and took away their independence. Moreover, the battalion commander himself did not take the initiative but rather waited for instructions from his senior officer. Every minute was precious, and the result was that the enemy was able to turn the battle in his favor by a decisive counterattack.

Commanders must not be over-supervised at exercises; their initiatives and self-reliance must be encouraged. This is a guarantee that mature command qualities will develop. Special attention here should be given to new officers who have recently taken command of combat collectives. It is relevant to mention this here because in the conditions of modern battle subunits are more and more frequently operating away from main forces. And their success will depend largely on the initiative and self-reliance of the commanders of crews, platoons, flights, companies, and other subunits equivalent to them.

Summer combat training offers every opportunity to teach commanders and all personnel to act with initiative, daring, and determination. The competition to celebrate the 60th anniversary of Great October in a worthy manner is calling forth a surge of energy and creative initiative in our Soviet fighting men, a desire to achieve new successes in the struggle to raise combat readiness still further. Our fighting men are working hard to master the science of victory forged in the battles for our country. They are swelling the ranks of rated specialists and masters of military affairs and improving their own physical condition, endurance, and level of training. And the subunits, units, and ships which are achieving the best results in performance of combat training missions are those whose commanders try to find the most rational ways to improve the combat training of their subordinates without waiting for help from above.

Energetic and purposeful party political workers are expected to help accomplish these missions. Relying on the experience of the last war and taking advantage of the great surge of political enthusiasm aroused in the army and navy by the decisions of the May 1977 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the sixth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and discussion of the draft of the new USSR Constitution, commanders, political agencies, and party organizations actively mold communist conviction in our fighting men and teach them the unflinching will to victory, the spirit of the attack, courage and bravery, endurance and self-control, and readiness to perform their military duty selflessly.

Initiative, activism, and the ability to show creativity in performing assigned missions have always distinguished Soviet commanders. Improving these qualities in commanders of all levels will help further strengthen the fighting effectiveness and combat readiness of our Armed Forces.

11,176 CSO: 1801

NAVAL TRAINING AND NAVAL RELATED ACTIVITIES

Role in World War II: Belittlement Rebutted

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Jul 77 p 3

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Achkasov and Col Yu. Perechnev: "Actuality and Idle Fabrications"]

[Text] The analysis of the world situation contained in the documents and resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress provide a key to a deeper understanding of the most important features of the contemporary era. One of its most characteristic traits is aggravation of the ideological struggle between imperialism and socialism, which constitutes a battle for the consciousness of the masses. Imperialist propaganda assigns an important position in the ideological struggle against socialism and progress to falsification of the history of World War II as a whole and the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union in particular. Bourgeois historiographers seek to minimize first and foremost the role and achievements of the Soviet Union and the heroic Soviet Army in the defeat of German fascism and Japanese militarism.

The Soviet Navy is also being subjected to such attacks. As we know, its combat employment in the last war was determined by the situation, numerical strength, the political and strategic objectives assigned by the Communist Party and Soviet Government to our Armed Forces, as well as the continental character of the war itself, in which the principal missions were performed by ground forces. Many foreign historians and investigators, however, deliberately ignoring these facts, seek to prove that the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets were performing missions which were not typical for naval forces, and that their role in the 1941-1945 war was minuscule. This patent lie was not just now conceived. Its first disseminator was German Admiral F. Ruge in the book "War on the Sea, 1939-1945," published in Stuttgart in 1954.

Ruge's fabrications were taken up and utilized by American historian (E. Zimke) in the book entitled "From Stalingrad to Berlin," and subsequently by West German military historians in the book "Naval Power and Foreign Policy." Attempting to slander the performance of our navy, American historian R. Herrick states in the book "Soviet Naval Strategy" that "the

Soviet Navy was unable to adapt its strategy to that combination of strategic defense with tactical offensive operations which conditions demanded."

Some bourgeois historians not only distort the role of the Soviet Navy during World War II and the character of its actions, but also resort to crude attacks.

Typical in this regard is a book recently published in London, entitled "The History of Russian and Soviet Naval Might." The author is American professor D. Mitchell. The author deliberately plays down the victories of the Soviet Navy in the war against fascist Germany and its allies, belittles Soviet art of naval warfare, and attempts to discredit Soviet naval personnel and Soviet naval equipment in the war years.

Mitchell claims that "the Russians never fully utilized the potential naval power at their disposal" and allegedly adhered to "a strategy of minimum risk and minimum gain." In conclusion the author claims that the Soviet Navy demonstrated "considerably less effectiveness than other navies."

Let us turn, however, to the real facts of the Great Patriotic War. We know that the Nazi command set for itself the task of destroying our fleets primarily by destroying their bases. However, they were unable to accomplish this either by bombing raids from the air or attacks by land.

Defense of naval bases constituted an important element in the combined army and navy effort to thwart the offensive plans of the German-fascist command. Considerable fleet manpower and resources were assigned to this task: ships, airplanes, naval infantry, coast artillery, and air defense forces. The outcome of the defense depended on capabilities to replace losses in personnel and equipment and to achieve uninterrupted supply to the combat troops of ammunition, fuel, and food. In most cases sea lines of communication were the sole means of supplying coastal beachheads and base areas which were cut off from access by land. For example, during the defense of Odessa more than 58,000 men, approximately 27,000 tons of ammunition, more than 13,000 tons of food and stock feed were transported to this base, while 300,000 tons of civilian cargo and 350,000 persons were evacuated. Warships made 723 escort runs alone. During the 8 months defense of Sevastopol', cargo ships and transports, escorted by warships, made 513 runs in both directions. Activities of the Red-Banner Baltic Fleet were just as intensive in supplying naval bases which were cut off by land.

Employment of naval artillery to support land forces also played a substantial role. Heavy caliber, long range, high accuracy, and the enormous destructive effect of the shells made it possible to utilize warships and coastal batteries to perform the most diversified missions on land. In 1941 alone 360 naval guns, ranging in caliber from 100 to 406 mm, participated in repulsing the enemy's September offensive on Leningrad. Naval artillery also played a significant role later, when the enemy was attempting

to destroy the city with artillery bombardments. In order to remove ship-board artillery from the overall system of defense of Leningrad, in April 1942 the German-fascist command mounted a special operation code-named "Eisstoss." This mission was assigned to the forces of the 1st Air Force. Thanks to organized countermeasures by our air defense forces, however, the operation to destroy the ships of the Red-Banner Baltic Fleet failed to achieve its objective.

The Soviet Navy is justly proud of the contribution it made to the common cause of crushing Hitler's armies on the decisive Soviet-German front. Our navy was unparalleled in smoothness of coordinated action with ground troops, precision of coordination of efforts and achieved results of joint actions by naval forces and formations and combined units of the Soviet Army. Particularly effective were naval amphibious landing operations, which comprised the highest degree of coordination between naval and ground forces actions.

While the navies of the Western nations landed amphibious assault forces exclusively in the process of a strategic offensive and always with an overwhelming superiority over enemy forces, for our navy these situation factors were not determining. Approximately one third of all amphibious landings (and there were a total of more than 110 in the entire war) were mounted by our fleets and flotillas in the course of strategic defense.

The Soviet Navy also successfully employed amphibious landings during Soviet offensive operations. A conscientious historian cannot ignore such brilliantly executed landing operations as the Kerch'-Feodosiya and the Novorossiysk landings. Our men displayed in these operations a high art of naval warfare, selfless bravery and courage.

The war on enemy lines of communication constituted an important component part of combat operations of the Soviet Navy during the war years. Some dishonest bourgeois historians seek to ignore this vast area of combat activities by our navy, which were quite impressive from the first day of the war right up to Germany's surrender. Submarines searched out and destroyed German warships, cargo ships and transports, and planted mines along their routes; aircraft and surface ships, particularly torpedo boats, persistently sought out enemy warships and destroyed them at sea, in coastal waters and in base.

The entire world is familiar with exceptional courage displayed under the most difficult conditions, for example, by the submarine detachments of the Red-Banner Baltic Sea. Suffice it to recall the heroic campaign of submarine Shch-406 under the command of Capt 3d Rank Ye. Osipov. On its very first patrol it sank four cargo ships representing a total displacement of 30,000 tons.

It is also well known, for example, that in the fall of 1941 top German military leaders were concerned by the situation in the Far North. Disruption

of shipping in coastal waters by Soviet submarine forces and aircraft and naval actions on the coastal flank totally thwarted the advance on Murmansk by a German mountain rifle corps.

During the war years our surface ships, submarines, aircraft, coast artillery and mines sank 1,245 combatant ships and auxiliary vessels, and 1,307 cargo ships and transports totaling more than 3,148,000 register tons on the enemy's lines of communication. Thanks to this effort, enormous manpower and resources of Nazi Germany failed to reach the front lines and could not be utilized by the enemy, including in Germany's most critical situations.

Naval aviation made a large contribution toward victory. In the Northern Fleet, for example, in the first period of the war alone naval aviation flew 26,000 sorties. One cannot forget the heroic deeds of naval pilot Twice Hero of the Soviet Union B. Safonov, who died the death of the brave while defending an allied convoy, plus many other heroes.

Thus our navy, with vigorous and resolute actions, not only helped achieve victory on the Soviet-German front but also rendered support to the navies of our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. Attacking enemy bases, sea lines of communication and groups of warships, our navy made a major contribution toward the struggle against the enemy's navy. It is not surprising that the German command was compelled to maintain against our navy substantial naval forces in the Baltic, in northern waters and in the Black Sea, continuously reinforcing them with ships and aircraft from the Atlantic. Much credit must go to the Soviet Navy for the fact that the Allies succeeded in winning the "Battle of the Atlantic."

Soviet navymen utilized all the naval means at their disposal to beat the enemy. As a rule they would take a maximum risk in order to achieve maximum gain.

Soviet naval personnel victoriously carried the naval colors to the shores of Northern Norway, Romania and Bulgaria. They fought at Belgrade, Budapest, Vienna, Bratislava, and Berlin. Our navy actively assisted land forces in defeating Japan's Kwantung Army and in liberating Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.

Throughout the entire war Soviet naval personnel honorably carried out their assigned missions. Regardless of the attempts on the part of certain dishonest Western historians, they will not succees in defaming the heroic activities of our Navy during the Great Patriotic War.

Violation of Regulations

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jul 77 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank N. Remizov: "Contrary to Regulations"]

[Text] Sr Lt V. Saprykin wrote a letter to the editors claiming that for a trivial infraction the chief of staff, Capt-Lt V. Motuzenko, had removed him

from watch 2 hours prior to watch change, and on the following day had ordered him to report for duty literally 2 hours early. The author of the letter stated that the practice of removal from watch with the necessity of subsequently making up the time had become a quite regular occurrence on board ship, constituting a violation of regulations pertaining to frequency of going on watch (according to regulations, watch is organized in no less than three sequences, and consequently it is wrong to assign a person to duty within a 24-hour period).

We first informed the political section chief of Sr Lt V. Saprykin's letter. For some reason he was not interested in the facts of the case but immediately summoned several officers and requested information on the letter's author. He made it clear that he only wanted to hear about the negative aspects of this officer. When one of the officers commented that Saprykin was doing a good job leading a political instruction group, the political worker waved him to silence: you must be confused, that could not be true.

When we asked how he evaluated the facts of the case as contained in the letter, the political section chief replied without enthusiasm: "Well, if that is what happened, then executive officer Captain-Lieutenant Motuzenko was wrong. The fact is he is a good, efficient officer, while Saprykin --- well, you know, Saprykin...."

I spoke with Senior Lieutenant Saprykin, executive officer on a base minesweeper. He stated that he had previously been appointed assistent duty officer, while now he was acting duty officer.

"But I have been unlucky again," the officer commented. "Captain-Lieutenant Motuzenko once again removed me from duty, with 3 days confinement to quarters, although according to regulations he has no such authority."

A perusal of the pertinent documents and conversations with officers and warrant officers indicated that in that subunit they indeed remove men from duty fairly often. Sr Lt O. Zolotarev, Lt S. Sinyakov, Warrant Officers S. Kovrizhkin, V. Ditsul and other have been subjected to this measure. But the main thing is that these men are frequently put back on duty without observing the minimum time between duty watches as specified by regulations.

The commanding officer of the subunit, Capt 3d Rank V. Matskov, told me that his chief of staff had requested of him permission to place on the next day's duty roster officers who had been removed from duty.

"Of course I did not give permission," the commanding officer commented.

Unfortunately, as I learned, Capt 3d Rank V. Matskov himself had frequently removed officers and warrant officers from duty, replacing them with the first man to come along.

"Recently," recalls Sr Lt N. Selivokhin, "Captain 3d Rank Matskov telephoned:
'You are going on duty to replace Senior Lieutenant Zolotarev, whom I shall remove from watch.' I must confess that I was not very happy — to go on watch without sleep or preparation. But an officer from higher head-quarters happened to be on the spot and persuaded the commanding officer not to violate regulations."

We spoke with the chief of staff, Capt-Lt V. Motuzenko. Evidently in order that there remain no question about his position, while proceeding from the dock to the ship (our interview took place in a cabin on board ship), he removed from duty the officer of the deck and the man standing watch at the gangplank. The ship's commanding officer merely shrugged his shoulders: he had not been asked or told anything.

"I have removed and shall continue to remove remiss personnel from duty," Capt-Lt V. Motuzenko told us. "I don't know about the finer legal points -- regulations say nothing about removal from watch, particularly as a punishment. But obviously a superior officer has such authority."

"But how about putting back on watch the following day? That is contrary to regulations."

"What's the big deal? If you can't stand watch properly, do it over again."

"Your punishment of Saprykin exceeded your authority."

"One can't remember everything," replied Motuzenko. "I fail to understand why it is that because of some person by the name of Saprykin you are keeping people from their work and attempting to come to the defense of negligent individuals."

The fact is that nobody was trying to defend negligent personnel. Indeed, when some officers and warrant officers perform their duties poorly, sometimes the need arises to remove them from the watch. Senior Lieutenant Saprykin, who committed errors while on duty, deserved this. However, in the first place, order must be maintained strictly in conformity with regulations, and in the second place, one should consider the effectiveness of constant removal from watch and assignment to watch in violation of regulations. We are dealing here with young officers who have not yet acquired the requisite experience and know-how. Perhaps it would be more advisable to elaborate a system of measures for training and indoctrinating officers and warrant officers standing watch, with watch organized in conformity with relations.

We should comment that duty officers here are frequently diverted while on duty by matters pertaining to their table of organization function. Nor does the subunit always concern itself with a "proper fit" of the duty roster schedule with the officer and warrant officer shore leave schedule. This circumstance, combined with hasty changes in the duty roster, inevitably leads to disruption in the rhythm of the men's work and rest.

It is our opinion that the higher commanders should take a close look at the work style of headquarters and at organization of watch duty in the subunit.

Training Procedures on Nuclear Submarine

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jul 77 p 2

[Article by Capts 1st Rank M. Korenevskiy and G. Savichev: "Out There in the Ocean"]

[Text] Today it takes a painstaking investigation to establish who was the first to come up with the excellent idea of organizing competition on board a submarine at sea not between subunits — combat departments, groups, and specialist teams, as has been the practice for many years, but rather between watch crews. But one can state with confidence that this was the fruit of collective search and was maturing at a time when submariners, conquering the world ocean, were putting to sea for months—long cruises.

The crew seemed to regroup on these long cruises: it was not the combat department but rather the watch, composed of representatives of all combat departments, which would become for an extended period of time a unified collective, particularly united by a common responsibility for literally everything taking place on board the ship during that crew's watch. departments are very dissimilar: their makeup, size, equipment, and expenditure of efforts to achieve the objective differ. And it is difficult to determine who stands higher today in the competition -- the engineering department, navigation department, or radio subunit; have they successfully performed the day's task, and have there been serious errors which clearly move the entire combat department down a step lower than the others? They of course made these determinations, and not by rule of thumb but on the basis of a logically substantiated and generally fair system of grading. But it did not enable one to specify and convincingly stress that which one would call obviousness of victory. And very frequently the winners did not experience genuine moral satisfaction. And a great many "whys" arose with the defeated. They did not see, did not feel the distance by which they had lost, without which one cannot immediately understand where the weak points are and what elements must be immediately strengthened.

But what about watch crews? They are identical in composition, in number of specialists; their "field" and nature of actions coincide precisely. A perfect situation for competition!

This new innovation proved to be surprisingly capacious. It evoked and accommodated a great many initiative proposals: how to create favorable conditions for meeting individual pledges, how to compare performance results with convincing clarity, and how to ensure equal opportunity to excel.... The new innovation led to organization of party and Komsomol groups on a watch crew basis, while party-political work at sea began influencing, directly and on a daily basis, the course of performance of the ship's assigned mission.

Preciseness in recommendation, instruction and advice is important, and it is a good thing when one is asked to learn from the leaders not only "a responsible attitude toward the job," "a high degree of conscientiousness," "dexterity," etc, but also something more concrete: a technique honed by an expert, enabling one to surpass performance standards, an innovation in the conduct of practice drills, improving their effectiveness and quality, excellent methodology of independent preparation for political instruction classes, seminars, and discussions. Competition between watches has increased in scope because, being maximally concrete in plan, it provides incentive and ensures that many follow the concrete know-how of the top performers.

"Competition between watches? How does that benefit us?" surprisedly asked Capt 3d Rank V. Morozov, political worker on a missile-armed nuclear submarine. Such is the surprise shown at a question for which there is a limitless answer. "Life at sea is inconceivable without competitions! They toughen the will and strengthen the individual's sense of duty to the collective, promoting moral improvement...."

We asked him to speak in greater detail about the moral aspect of the matter: how is it essentially defined on the ship which is being emulated today by an entire branch of the Armed Forces, since the crew of the missile-armed submarine is the initiator of competition in the Navy for implementation of the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress and to honor the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution. What is being undertaken to ensure that such an important aspect is not ignored?

While Morozov gathers his thoughts, the conversation is continued by Capt 1st Rank A. Kazakov: "I see it as follows: a high degree of morality is formed in one's thinking about life, military service, one's place in the military, in comparing one's actions and deeds with the finest examples of performance of duty. It is necessary to create a situation in which one wants to think and feel one's significance...."

Morozov then proceeded to continue the captain's train of thought: "Absolutely right, without waiting for the right situation to arise, but to set up such a situation!"

...At a certain exercise the missile-armed nuclear submarine was to penetrate a powerful "enemy" ASW barrier. The giant submarine had been proceeding toward the barrier for several days, and now the culmination of the entire exercise was beginning, the battle drawing closer. It was decided to dedicate the very critical watch during the night of penetration to famous knight of the depths Magomet Gadzhiyev.

Examining the assembled men of his watch, officer V. Yeres'ko noted on the men's faces the mark of solemnity, enthusiasm and a kind of focused attention. As the officer quizzed them on their duties, all the men replied with enthusiasm, giving full and precise answers. The questioning and briefing were now completed.

"Comrades," the officer addressed his men. "It is most probable that penetration of the ASW barrier will begin during our watch. Therefore this watch, as a particularly important one, is dedicated to the memory of Hero of the Soviet Union Gadzhiyev!"

And Yeres'ko briefly related the story of Gadzhiyev, about whom the Northern Fleet submariners had written to the toilers of Dagestan: "Nobody ever saw him indifferent or languid. He was a man of a highly passionate nature, of high Bolshevik principles, a tireless enthusiast."

"You know," continued Yeres'ko, proceeding to the watch's immediate tasks,
"our commanding officer is an experienced submariner and an excellent
tactician. But even such a commanding officer cannot guarantee success in
combat if each of us does not do everything he should to achieve victory.
We are not nuts and bolts in a piece of machinery — we are men! A bolt is
without a heart and soul. It does not possess moral strength, which is
characteristic only of man, adding to the power and capabilities of weapons...."

The officer surveyed his assembled men -- yes, what he had said had reached them: it was evident by their faces that it had reached them. He glanced at his watch and raised his voice: "It is time to begin the watch, in defense of the national interests of the USSR and in honor of the memory of Hero of the Soviet Union Capt 2d Rank Gadzhiyev!"

During that difficult watch on the night of the penetration, the watch under the command of officer Yeres'ko performed with enthusiasm, calculatedly, demonstrating examples of vigilance. Many of the men for the first time succeeded in surpassing performance standards which in the past they had met with only seconds to spare. Up there on top the ASW ships and aircraft, utilizing electronic equipment, were solidly sweeping the depths, seemingly not offering the submarine the slightest chance of slipping through. But nevertheless it succeeded in penetrating the barrier undetected, proceeded to its destination area and delivered a missile attack on the designated target.

Here we have reached a point which cannot simply be ignored, left without some consideration, for the "enemy" ASW crews at the exercise were by no means deficient in combat skill and tactical training. They too were extensively involved in competition, and yet they had lost.... Is this not because somewhere, in some elements of the barrier excellent specialists nevertheless performed like screws in a machine: flawlessly, reliably, but without passion, strengthening one's will to win, without excellent moral enthusiasm, which redoubles strength? This bears thinking about.

PO 2d Class Pavel Viktorovich Zverev serves on board the nuclear submarine, from the social aspect a typical representative of his generation, which grew up under conditions of a mature socialist society, in the environment of the Soviet way of life. Completing the 10-year school, he got a job and soon had learned the specialty of repair mechanic. He took advantage of his right to continue his education, entering a polytechnic institute.

Then came the time to carry out his sacred, constitutional duty — to take his place among the defenders of the homeland. Before joining the crew of the submarine, Pavel received additional training, mastering another occupational specialty, which acquainted him with the most modern equipment. Specialties of this kind also represent a great resource following military service; demand for them will continue to grow as the nation's economy becomes increasingly saturated with automatic control, remote control, and electronics.

On board the nuclear submarine this young sailor was assigned to service a highly complex system: he had to monitor vigilantly a total of 36 sensors alone! He did not lose his presence of mind but kept asking the most unexpected questions of his superiors, and learned every detail of his job. In addition, he proposed original ideas on improving certain elements of the system. They were adopted and incorporated. The submarine was once visited by specialists from the factory; learning of the improvements made at the suggestion of this sailor, they were amazed at what good ideas they were. They decided to carry these ideas back to the plant.

In what way is this interesting information on Zverev pertinent to the subject of our comments: competition among naval personnel? Kazakov and Morozov are firmly convinced that it is directly pertinent. Should not the competition organizers proceed from a very important and extremely pleasant fact: with each new arrival of recruits, the ships receive increasingly more highly developed, technically knowledgeable young people of curiosity and initiative. In relationships within the collective — including competitions — these young people are not happy with that which is clearly obsolete but which continues to exist and be utilized as entirely suitable. Of course the older veterans should not be satisfied either, although it is easier for them to accept the customary. Even the most experienced leader should not ignore the particular attraction of the new and advanced for today's young people.

At one time, a long time ago, there was a unanimous decision on the submarines: every efficiency innovation proposal would receive 50 points in competition, for example, which would be added to the watch's points and then placed on the scales of performance results comparison. The idea was obvious: show innovativeness and advance your watch. The procedure was adopted on a regular basis, and provided good incentive for efficiency innovation. But why does Zverev, the strongest of the efficiency innovators, as Morozov concluded on the basis of certain observations, have a somewhat skeptical attitude toward this procedure and apparently consider it unfair? Suddenly Morozov realized what the matter was! Zverev's highly-valuable suggestions would receive 50 points apiece. And yet the most elementary efficiency innovation, such as relocation of the securing latch for a piece of equipment, also receives 50 points. Does that make sense? "No, it does not!" officer V. Antonov, head of the efficiency innovation committee, strongly agreed with the political worker. "What's more, it is harmful! With this procedure of awarding points, there is incentive for quantity but not quality!"

Does this mean that they had failed to realize that they were employing a "harmful" rule? No, it does not. There is a dialectics of competition. Yesterday certain standards, rules and criteria were beneficial, but today they begin to impede things, for they fail to correspond to changes in people and to a new turn in the spiral of competition. At the initiative of the party bureau it was decided to revise the rules of awarding points not only for efficiency innovation but for many other things as well. All criteria became more stringent, but this did not upset the men. On the contrary, the changes were accepted with approval, as a fact of increased confidence on the part of the party bureau and commanding officer in their increased abilities.

"Formerly 100 points were subtracted from the watch's performance score for a major mistake committed while on watch. The number has now been increased to 350! But on our last extended cruise we were not forced to apply the 'big fine': there were no major errors!" related officer V. Antonov. "We have definitely gained."

It is an axiom that substance, effectiveness and development of competition among military personnel are determined to a considerable degree by the attitude of the officers toward competition. Certain results are attained when an officer will do "everything required of him," while other, more substantial results are achieved when he actively seeks out reserve potential, when his meeting of his own personal socialist pledges enriches the knowledge and skills of others. On one of the nuclear submarines most recent cruises, a report on the topic was presented at a technical conference by officer P. Shtepa. Specialists claim that Pavel Vasil'yevich Shtepa's report could form the basis of a dissertation. Carrying out painstaking research, P. Shtepa increased his own knowledge and enriched his fellow personnel with interesting ideas — reserve potential for combat improvement.

Party member officer Anatoliy Fedorovich Stavrov is in charge of a study group entitled "From Congress to Congress." He works hard on this study group. As soon as the ship received newspapers containing the new draft USSR Constitution, a new series of classes began in the study group. And a new series of lectures is being prepared by an officer lecture group — on the great party of Lenin, on the great Soviet people, on the great duty of fighting men to the party and people. Socialist competition by naval personnel for implementation of the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress and in honor of the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution is being marked by new enthusiasm.

3024

CSO: 1801

CHIEF OF MILITARY TRADE DIRECTORATE CITES IMPROVED FACILITIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jul 77 p 4

[Article by Lt Gen Intend Serv Ye. Gol'dberg, chief of the Main Directorate of Trade of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "With Due Regard for Customer Demand — Today is Trade Worker Day"]

[Excerpts] The recently published decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers entitled "Steps for the Further Development of Trade" is a brilliant new testimony to the consistency of party policy to improve the standard of living of the working people in our country by every means. This decree makes the achievements of Soviet trade very clear, reveals shortcomings which still exist, and sets concrete tasks for the future.

The collective of the many thousands of workers at military trade enterprises warmly approve of this decree, as do all Soviet people. The military trade collective is celebrating Trade Worker Day with good statistics. In the first half of the current year 5.4 million rubles of various goods beyond the plan were sold. The plan was also fulfilled for all other technical-economic indexes.

Thanks to the growth in consumer goods production of the country the military trade network offers a constantly expanding assortment of food and industrial goods. The structure of commodity turnover has changed substantially. The sale of furniture, television sets, and other cultural and household good is steadily growing.

The proportion of potatoes, vegetables, fruits, citrus fruits, and berries, especially early-maturing ones, in the overall balance of food commodities sold has risen significantly. In the first six months of 1977 almost 10,000 tons of early potatoes, vegetables and berries more than last year were sold. Airplanes delivered fresh tomatoes, cucumbers, cherries, and more than 300 tons of strawberries to garrisons in the Far North, Transbaikal region, and Far East.

The main orientation of our work is to organize service to customers with due regard for customer demand. A precise knowledge of what the

customer needs, what things are in short supply and where and what things are over-stocked, helps us satisfy customer wants most fully. Fairs and bazaars to sell various goods are being set up in the garrisons more and more often.

The Main Directorate of Trade has conducted a series of commercial fairs for the system as a whole. Two of them, in the Northern Fleet and the Far East, have already been held this year and modeled styles for 1978. Commercial employees of the trade directorates and centers have been involved in the fairs. These fairs enable us to redistribute commodity stocks more correctly with due regard for customer demand and to outline prospects for development.

Progressive forms of trade have continued to develop. More than 50 percent of all goods are now sold by the self-service method. About three percent of industrial goods are sold on credit. This convenient form of trade makes it possible to acquire essential durable goods with payment deferred for up to two years.

It has become a common thing for stores and truck shops selling industrial goods to travel to remote and small garrisons. These trips are made on a planned basis. In 1976, for example, the number of trips per truck shop in the Northern Fleet reached 325 and each shop had commodity turnover of 167,000 rubles.

In many garrisons stores sell goods by sample, take advance orders, and deliver the goods to the home. There are more unmanned kiosks in the barracks and stalls on ships. Everyone has approved of gift trade on the docks when meeting ships returning from distant cruises and also the practice of sending packages to seamen serving far from their native shores. Mail order sales of commodities and books have increased. As a result, progressive methods of military trade accounted for nearly 60 percent of all turnover in the first half of 1977.

Public catering enterprises have learned better ways to provide officers with hot food, especially at field training periods. Our messhall workers tried to broaden the assortment of dishes and improve taste qualities. The competition held in 1976 for a best soldiers' and sailors' tearoom demonstrated the increased popularity of these facilities among our fighting men.

Domestic service to military servicemen and their families is expanding. Our sewing salons and shops make uniforms for generals, admirals, officers, and warrant officers according to individual orders. Many enterprises have expanded work in making civilian clothing for family members of servicemen, workers, and employees. Traveling forms of domestic service are used extensively in remote and small garrisons.

The material-technical base of military trade has continued to develop. Modern stores have been built in many garrisons. New, more high-powered commodity warehouses, fruit and vegetable storage areas, and refrigeration units have been into operation.

Great progress has been made in trade service on the eastern sector of the Baikal-Amur railroad. We began there from zero, as they say, and have increased commodity turnover to millions of rubles a year. But still, there are substantial reserves there for a further increase in the level of trade and sophistication of service.

Outstanding physical facilities for trade have been built in the Mil vice and Wuensdorf garrisons. The trade and domestic enterprises there have good buildings and the latest equipment. Up to 70 percent of the goods are sold by the self-service method. An equally strong material-technical base has been established in most garrisons of the Southern Group of Forces and in some garrisons of the Ural, Kiev, and Belorussian military districts.

The qualifications of military trade employees have risen greatly in recent times. More than half of our employees now have higher and secondary education.

Along with the achievements of military trade, however, there are also substantial shortcomings. Occasional interruptions in the sale of everyday necessities continue to occur in some places. Physical facilities are not being developed everywhere and some garrisons do not have stores and messhalls. Self-service and other progressive forms of trade are not being introduced aggressively.

All of these shortcomings are intolerable today. During preparations for the all-Army meeting on improving the everyday life of the troops all possible steps must be taken to improve the quality of trade and domestic service everywhere and to raise it to the level of current party demands.

11,176 CSO: 1801 NEED TO DEVELOP PHYSICAL TRAINING AND SPORTS STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jul 77 p 1

[Editorial: "Develop Physical Training, Sports"]

[Text] The Communist Party and Soviet Government show constant concern for the development of physical training and sports in our country, for strengthening the health of the people, and insuring harmonious development of the Soviet individual. The draft of the new USSR Constitution, which is now under universal discussion in the country, is one more striking manifestation of this concern. The draft of the new Constitution states that the right to recreation is insured, specifically, by the "development of mass sports, physical training, and tourism." All necessary conditions have been established in the Soviet Union for the population to engage in physical training and sports on a regular basis. The working people have thousands of gymnasiums and fields, stadiums, pools, and tourist centers. Physical training, sports, and tourism have become truly mass activities in our country.

The physical conditioning of fighting men and development of mass sports are considered very important in our Armed Forces. In the army and navy physical training is an important factor in troop combat readiness and an inseparable part of combat training. Regular physical training and sports help fighting men improve field, air, and sea training, strengthen discipline, instill the qualities and skills needed for successful actions in modern battle, and increase work capability.

Favorable conditions for a further increase in the level of physical preparedness of our personnel and the development of mass sports are being created among the troops during the summer period of combat training. This is when it is important to make full use of all forms of physical training for fighting men: morning exercises, regular training periods, incidental drills, and large-scale work in the subunits, sections, and teams, giving special attention to the development of the most popular Olympic sports and also to applied military and military-technical types of sports, especially aviation and water sports. As many fighting men as possible should be involved in regular drills in sections and teams;

these sessions should be headed by experienced, methodologically skilled rated athletes. Training periods and drills must be organized so that they insure maximum physical and psychological readiness to perform combat training missions. It is advisable in this, as the experience of the best units and ships demonstrates, to make broader use of multifaceted lessons, employ the competitive method, and increase the workload at all training periods and drills.

Multifaceted paramilitary contests and competitions based on combat training standards are becoming more widespread in the army and navy. In the units of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the Central Group of Forces, airborne forces, and the troops of the Moscow and Kiev military districts the multifaceted paramilitary contests include such events as running obstacle strips, laying out communications lines, loading ammunition into a tank, drill training, and the like. Paramilitary contests during ocean cruises on certain ships of the Northern and Black Sea fleets are interesting. The experience of these units and ships deserves attention and dissemination.

The questions of physical training for fighting men and mass sports activities should be a subject of constant attention for commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations and sports committees. Komsomol organizations have an especially broad field of activity. Who if not the Komsomol members should initiate interesting sports events!

The personal example of officers plays an important part in developing mass sports work. Of course, this obligates them to work constantly on improving their own physical conditioning, organizational skills, and methodological knowledge. Socialist competition is a powerful tool for the development of mass sports and helping fighting men master sports ratings and the standards of the VSK [All-Union Sports Set]. During preparations to celebrate the 60th anniversary of Great October in a worthy fashion the personnel of units and ships are working hard to fulfill obligations with respect to mass sports. One of the motorized rifle regiments of the Samara-Ul'yanovsk Berdichev Iron Division assumed this obligation: 95 percent of personnel must pass the standards of the VSK and receive ratings. They are successfully fulfilling this obligation, and there are many such examples.

Another equally important aspect of sports work to which commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations must devote constant attention is developing highly skilled athletes, above all in the Olympic sports of the program, who are capable of defending the sports honor of our country and its Armed Forces in the most important international competitions. Army and navy athletes have already won several brilliant victories this year: Jr Lt S. Nalbandyan, the wrestler, has won the world championship while gymnast Pvt V. Markelov and boxers Pvt V. Limasov and WO L. Shaposhnikov won gold medals at the European championships. The USSR Armed Forces team in the modern pentathelon won the Europe Cup.

However, there are also numerous shortcomings in work with leading athletes. The level of skill of army and navy track athletes, swimmers, academic rowers, weight-lifters, and soccer players is not rising fast enough. The principal causes of poor results in competitions are shortcomings in the training and educational process for athletes and poor preparation of reserves.

The leading athletes and coaches of the Armed Forces face major challenges: the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games are not too far away and full-scale preparation for them should already be underway. In September of this year our athletes face a tough test at the summer Games of the Fraternal Armies, which will be held in Cuba.

Army sport has great potential. District, group, and fleet sports clubs must be revitalized. Experienced teachers should search for talented young athletes and regularly give skilled assistance to young people's schools, which must become true centers for the training of future champions and record setters. Special attention should be devoted to the development of such important Olympic sports as track and field, swimming, gymnastics, and soccer. Skillful organization of the training and educational process in the teams, based on a modern scientific approach, guarantees success in this work. The coach must be the central figure in this process. The coach is expected to see that the athlete's skill grows and that he or she learns lofty moral qualities: Soviet patriotism, internationalism, will to victory, and responsibility for the sports honor of our country and its Armed Forces.

The steady development and improvement of physical training and sports in the army and navy is one of the important objectives of commanders, staff, political agencies, and party and Komsomol organizations.

11,176 CSO: 1801

MOBILE MISSILE BATTERY COMBAT TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jul 77 p 1

[Article by Maj P. Chernenko, Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "Newcomers Find Their Place in the Ranks"]

[Text] Fifty-five degrees Celsius. The metal was untouchable and an ordinary room thermometer's scale would not go high enough for the truck where the command post was located. But work was surging forward at the launch site: preparations were being completed to launch the missile.

Sr Lt Vladimir Muranov, the battery commander, was an experienced officer. He commanded a launch team and served as deputy battery commander. He was a specialist 1st class who had been awarded the Order "For Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3rd degree.

A march to an assigned region and then work at the launch site. The battery commander had not rested since the assembly signal called his missile forces onto the road. The tactical situation demanded continuous action and Muranov was giving orders and instructions and controlling the subunit precisely. Now the missile was being held by the boom of a crane. He waved his hands and the launcher was rushed up to it. The battery commander did not say a word; his hands spoke for him. And mechanic-driver Pvt N. Spirov understood his hands perfectly. The launchers stopped directly under the boom. In a minute soldiers were climbing on it like ants, also silent, with no unnecessary fuss. Only the sweat coming through their uniforms showed the effort which this working precision cost the missile soldiers.

I knew that among the team members were new soldiers who had recently arrived in the subunit, but I was not sure which ones they were judging by their actions.

"We received outstanding replacements! Take gunner Private Dudkin. Just watch him a bit. How can you say he is a newcomer in the team?" Muranov smiled and pointed to a tall, strongly built soldier. I had noticed him much earlier and thought he was an experienced specialist.

"The new men try very hard," Muranov continued. "They work with great desire. All have resolved to become rated specialists and outstanding in training by the 60th anniversary of Great October. The collective has a tradition of helping them master the equipment."

The subunit is very skillful in helping new soldiers find their place in the ranks. Newcomers are familiarized with the history of the unit, its traditions, and the combat equipment from the first day forward. The best fighting men in the battery, Sgt V. Khan'ko, Jr Sgt M. Ivanov, and Pvt A. Malyshev, told the newcomers about their combat specializations and offered help in learning their new duties. The training period which I was witnessing was the first serious test of the young missile troops operating in a situation approximating that of combat.

The launcher was loaded. While Muranov reported readiness to march I became acquainted with other men in the battery such as deputy team leader Pvt S. Karnaukhov and computations squad leader Jr Sgt A. Chernyavskiy. Private Karnaukhov is the most experienced member of the launch team, but he has not been a deputy team leader long. On this day, moreover, he was leading the team. Junior Sergeant Chernyavskiy, a specialist 2nd class, commanded an outstanding squad. The missile soldiers were unified by love of their work and they spoke of the weapon with great pleasure.

The column of vehicles stretched out along the unpaved road. On a turn a gust of wind blew away the cloud of dust and the entire panorama of the march opened up before us: the column stretched away into a ravine between the hills. An order came over the radio to occupy the launch position. The vehicles turned sharply off the road. In a couple of minutes the camouflage nets had covered them up.

The topographers were the first to go to work. PFC V. Shudlo quickly determined the coordinates of the launch site and passed them on to the battery commander. Swift work was also underway at the launcher. The main enemy now was time. And the sun continued to beat down mercilessly. The soldiers' uniforms grew even darker from sweat.

"Ready to launch!" Private Karanukhov reported to the battery commander.

The missile troops raced to shelter.

The cable stretched from the launcher to the remote control panel like a black snake. Signal lights flashed on the console. The cigar-shaped body of the missile, raised up by the launcher guide, looked menancingly at the zenith.

[&]quot;Attention, launch!"

The missile did not set off into the blue sky on this occasion. But if it had been necessary its strike would have been unstoppable. Instruments recorded that it had been accurately aimed.

The commander took note of the skillful actions of the new soldiers, Privates V. Dudkin and P. Kryzhanovskiy, and of the entire launch team.

11,176 CSO:1801 IMPORTANCE OF SUPPLY ECONOMY IN COMBAT TRAINING STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jul 77 p 1

[Article by Maj Gen V. Volovich: "Points for Economy"]

[Text] I was very interested to read Lt Yu. Zhdanov's report in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA under the title "Not For the Sake of the Evaluation." My attention was particularly drawn to the story about using a small-caliber rifle secured to the barrel of an artillery gun for drills. The author noted that the intensity of training periods was increased by this. The expenditure of small-caliber shells which are needed in conventional drills using a sub-caliber tube was also reduced to a minimum. It occurred to me: What if the results of training had proved insignificant? Would battery commander Sr Lt A. Dergachev still have deserved praise? It seems that even in this case a good word for him would be in place. When two commanders achieve identical training results from subordinates the best methodologist is the one who needed less materiel to do it. In other words, the more economical one. The effectiveness and economy of a training period are related categories.

I recently attended a tactical exercise in one of the motorized rifle units of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District. The exercise had a composite subject which they had worked through several times before. Therefore, the comparisons which were made during the review were not surprising. They indicated that the motorized riflemen's field training had improved. They also had one other very eloquent comparison of figures. It turned out that the expenditure of engine life and fuel was 20 percent less than during an exercise held earlier under similar conditions. How can this be ignored when determining the effectiveness of a training activity?

However, a trip into the field is, unfortunately, rarely analyzed from the economic point of view. Why is this? After all, the requirement laid down in the report by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th party congress, to count every ruble, every hour of labor, and every ton of output exactly and use them efficiently, applies in full to military workers.

Economy does not mean reducing expenditures without considering the nature of the jobs being done. There can be no question of economies which might infringe even slightly on combat readiness and the level of personnel training. To be a thrifty commander means to be constantly searching in two directions: 1) to select from all possible variations that one which produces the maximum result for given expenditures and 2) to find ways to accomplish a precisely defined task with minimum expenditure of forces and means.

It is the lofty duty of commanders, staffs, political agencies, and army and navy party organizations to see that the engine and energy life of equipment, every missile and shell, and every kilogram of fuel is used with maximum effect. The reserves available here are obvious. One company or battery attains the title of outstanding while using the same amount of resources as used by another which has difficulty receiving a satisfactory mark. It is apparent that some training periods in the second subunit were, as the saying goes, only spinning their wheels.

The challenge of rational expenditure of material and monetary means is not by itself a new one. But combat training plans are not given careful economic substantiation in all units. Sometimes the commander completely forgets about this aspect of things. Staffs, service chiefs, fleet specialists, and engineering-technical personnel do not give it sufficient attention. But after all, this is a matter that concerns them closely.

I have had occasion to meet officers who have said that they simply do not have enough time to figure out the economic aspects of training activities. But they would never allow themselves the excuse of "not enough time" for organizing march security or outposts. This, they say, is a direct duty. Economic substantiation is also a direct duty.

In the case mentioned at the start of this article the economy of the training methods was obvious. Much more often, however, the military-economic expediency of a particular training activity cannot be assessed without calculations. For example, simple addition allows one to form an idea of expenditures for an exercise being planned. By comparing the results obtained with available resources and with expenditures for an exercise of similar scope conducted earlier, the quality of the chosen variation of the exercise can be judged while still in the preparatory stage.

Setting ceilings on expenditures of material is an effective method of insuring economy.

Unfortunately, planning agencies often raise the ceilings without thorough study of the state of affairs in the local areas. For example, in the motorized rifle unit whose exercise was discussed above, plans for equipment operation and the activities of the administrative plan were deliberately not coordinated with allocated resources. It was

considered "normal" to take as much equipment as possible out for field training periods and serious mistakes were made in organizing servicing of the equipment; the primary records were not kept in proper order. A thorough analysis of the state of affairs, made by specialists and senior officers, led to a sharp change in the situation. Last year showed that with a thoughtful approach it is possible to make the training process more intensive while strictly observing established limits on expenditures of materiel. Combining training periods, rational movement from one training site to another, active use of simulators, and so on are very helpful methods.

Socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of Great October is a powerful means for activating the efforts of each and every individual in the struggle to observe economy measures. Competition has an enormous role in resolving this problem. All that must be done is to organize it on a business-like, concrete basis.

Not long ago we learned how competition for economy was organized in the N unit. Capt I. Fedyukevich, for example, has made numerous interesting proposals to improve records of the expenditure of fuel and lubricants. In this unit every driver is issued a special card called an "Economy Card." The obligations assumed in competition are entered on it and then ongoing data on fulfillment are added each month. This is a fine idea, but as soon as we compared the cards with the trip logs their formalistic approach immediately became obvious. The amount of fuel used in a run was often clumsily adjusted to fit established norms. Various other adjustments were used to show "economy" even in cases of overexpenditure. Such "playing with statistics" causes nothing but harm in educational work.

Practice shows that by no means all officers are able to make the necessary economic calculations quickly. And it seems easy to find an explanation for this. Only in rare cases do cadets and students at military schools touch on this problem. Meanwhile, the interests of our work demand that commanders master the methods of military-economic analysis at least as well as they have mastered the methods of analyzing a tactical situation or techniques for orientation on the terrain. I think that a course in "military econometrics" (a tentative name, of course) would be a good idea at institutions of higher military learning. The subject of this course would be the economic aspect of military activities and the method would be military-economic analysis.

When determining the effectiveness of any training activity, it is important that the senior officer evaluate its economy. The evaluation index used for this may be called the relative economy factor. It would reflect the ratio of expenditures in periods under comparison or in the conduct of similar activities to the results obtained.

11,176 CSO: 1801

TRANSBAYKAL M.D. COMMANDER ON COMMAND TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jul 77 p 2

[Article by Army Gen P. Belik, commander of troops of the Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District: "The Senior Officer's Advice and Assistance"]

[Text] The regiment was introduced into battle from a march. Supported by tank and artillery fire, the motorized riflemen delivered a powerful strike against the enemy. The actions of the men showed teamwork and vigor. The commanders controlled their subordinates firmly and skill-fully.

This was noticed at the review later. The Guards Motorized Rifle Port Arthur Regiment received a high score.

I have observed the men of the Port Arthur Regiment in numerous training battles. They have always had complex, dynamic situations which demand that personnel be able to make full use of the combat capabilities of their equipment and weapons and that they possess a broad tactical outlook, initiative, excellent physical conditioning and psychological stability. And every time, it gives me great satisfaction to say, the motorized riflemen have accomplished their assigned missions, operating intelligently, boldly, and with determination. It is already a tradition among them and the primary keepers and continuers of this tradition are the officers and warrant officers (praporshchik).

The Port Arthur Regiment is now commanded by Guards Lt Col S. Rumyantsev, who was appointed to his post quite recently. He had learned a great deal as chief of staff of this regiment, when he was an effective, enterprising assistant to the former commander. The exceptional mutual understanding between Guards Lieutenant Colonel Rumyantsev and the battalion commanders, which could be felt during the tactical exercise, took more than one day to form. The battalion commanders considered themselves his former pupils. Mutual understanding among them is rooted in command training periods; Guards Lieutenant Colonel Rumyantsev put his whole heart, as they say, into command training from his first days in the regiment.

It is very clear in the regiment that the workstyle of the sole commander is invariably reflected in the everyday activity of all the officers subordinate to him. Guards Maj V. Semka and Guards Capt. A. Suvorov, battalion commanders, are calm, thoughtful, and consistent in training and indoctrinating the company commanders. Guards Capt V. Chupakhin, battalion chief of staff, does a great deal of work with new officers. The company commanders are constantly concerned about the development of the platoon leaders.

Strict controls, high standards, timely assistance, and good advice from the direct superior. These are not only the foundation for successful accomplishment of training and indoctrination problems which are difficult for a young officer; they are also an enormous moral force. The unity of the military collective and establishment of healthy relations and a creative attitude in it depend especially on the man in charge. Surely the words of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev apply to the military collective as well: it is precisely in the collective that professional know-how, skill, and the habit of conscientious work are passed on from one generation to the next. It is here, from heart to heart, that communist ideology and loyalty to the party cause are transmitted to young people.

From heart to heart. In the course of his service each officer performs his duties under the direct supervision of many commanders. Which ones do we remember most often? Who did we not just respect but love? It is the men with open hearts. Those who are deeply party-minded, give themselves completely to the service, and demand the same of others. The commanders who are able to bring out all that is best in a subordinate, give each individual confidence in his own strength, and inspire subordinates to selfless labor.

When we want to give a brief description of an officer we say: he served in a certain regiment of a certain division or under the command of a certain commander. There is a reason for this.

It is not easy for Lt Col G. Gorovoy to count how many officers, his former subordinates, he has launched on their careers. Three of them have become outstanding commanders in our district. Even today they say: "In a situation like this Lieutenant Colonel Gorovoy would have done the following."

We have many commanders like Lieutenant Colonel Gorovoy, men who have become long-standing examples for their subordinates. To their successors they pass on ideological conviction, professional knowledge, and know-how in training and indoctrination, in short, everything that goes into the commander's authority.

But does the officer or warrant officer always find a skillful and well-meaning teacher in the commander or senior officer? Sometimes a comrade who has taken a new position and is having a difficult time

emotionally with this stage of development will receive so many criticisms that he will lose confidence in his ability and potential.

For example, the case of Maj Yu. Kotov gave me a good deal to think about. Kotov had good military training and a strong will when he was promoted to the position of regimental commander. In other words, he had many of the qualities necessary to a commander. What this capable officer lacked at first was organizational skills and a teacher's sensitivity. These things could have been acquired and developed on the job.

Among his immediate superiors, however, there were no experienced, tactful advisors prepared right away to help the new commander, as the interest of the work required. After making a number of mistakes Major Kotov was forced to request a different position.

Some commanders believe that an officer who has been promoted no longer needs help. But how can one in a lower service position acquire all the organizational skills necessary to perform more complex duties? Promotion is a kind of advance payment. It is a belief that a capable, diligent, officer with a lofty sense of responsibility to the party and the people will find a good teacher in the person of his superior, one who will give him the necessary help and support during his developmental phase.

Naturally, this does not mean excessive supervision. Senior officers have a direct obligation to organize the professional training of subordinate officers so that their tactical and methodological school is steadily being refined, so that every training day and every training activity enriches them, broadens their outlook, and strengthens their will.

"The commander (chief)," it says in the Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces, "is obliged...to be the organizer and leader of training and indoctrination for subordinates, to combine high standards, strong principles, and intolerance of shortcomings with respect, trust, and constant concern for the men."

It is important here to observe the time-tested principle that the subordinate is taught by his immediate superior. The division commander is responsible above all for the training of regimental commanders, while they work with battalion commanders and so on.

Life forces us to recall this. I have seen cases where a regimental commander preferred to conduct instructional training periods with platoon leaders personally and himself took charge of the actions of subunits at an exercise with field fire. In such a case did he make use of his very limited time? No, he did not. There is no question that the regimental commander will conduct training periods, for example with company commanders, better than a new battalion commander might.

But does this lessen the battalion commander's personal responsibility for training his subordinate officers? Furthermore, how is he to improve his methodological skill if a higher-ranking commander takes over his functions?

Of course, a regimental commander is always concerned about the training of platoon leaders and company commanders. He is responsible for everything in the regiment and he must look after this training, direct it, and evaluate it. To do this correctly is also part of the art of being a commander.

Some commanders give subordinates missions in the most general terms, not going into detail; others stipulate the plan in such fine detail that there is nothing left for the subordinate officer to do but write all the details in his notebook. Needless to say, both methods are ineffective. The experienced commander always values an opportunity for a detailed discussion of the variations for accomplishing a mission with his subordinate who will carry it out; the commander does not limit his creativity and initiative, but at the same time guides it in the necessary direction.

The principle of the superior teaching the subordinate expresses the essence of a multifaceted process. Advice and help when difficulties arise is by no means the hardest thing. After all, a subordinate officer cannot be taught solid command skills by advice alone. He must be taught and indoctrinated in the field, in a situation approximating that of combat; training must be practical. Organizing training periods for officers is far from simple. Only the superior officer who decisively rejects hard and fast rules and stereotypes and is able to structure training periods on the basis of current methodology will train subordinates effectively today.

Training for new officers is inconceivable without constant and meaningful checks by senior officers on their independent work and fulfillment of personal plans and without direction when the young officers participate in competition.

The thoughtful commander, placing great value on the educational power of socialist competition, always uses comparisons, names those who are ahead and behind, and on this basis develops a constant dissatisfaction with what has been achieved and an ability to make a principled evaluation of each index.

Some commanders spend a good deal of time in the subunit, apparently actively involved in teaching subordinates and giving them much advice, but it does not pay off as expected. The point here is that the assistance given is not that good. The ability to uncover the deepseated causes of problems and suggest reliable ways of eliminating them is not given to everyone. The units of the district have many good things to say about Colonels M. Korotkiy and M. Sashkin, senior officers in the directorate of combat training. They are demanding and

high-principled in the role of referees, but generously share their know-how with commanders while they themselves teach and learn at the same time by carefully collecting new and progressive ideas.

The enormous patriotic enthusiasm called forth by discussion of the draft of the new USSR Constitution now reigns among the forces of the district. The officers, warrant officers, sergeants, and soldiers are striving to celebrate the 60th anniversary of Great October with unconditional fulfillment of training plans, programs, and socialist obligations. And among the factors which will determine attainment of these goals, an important place belongs to the constant concern of senior officers for successful development of junior officers, improving the skills of all officers in training and indoctrinating competent defenders of our native land.

11,176 CSO: 1801

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